Tita?

R

RichardVinke

Eigenlijk wil ik weten wat voor processor, geheugen enz als er in zit. Het volgende weet ik al:

Flash 32kB (28 vrij), RAM 1024 B, EEprom 32kB, met Crypto, 3.57 MHz.

Wat wordt er bedoeld met: Crypto? Zit er in de flash een crypto algorithme ofzo?
 
Specification:

Wafer smartcard
OS version 1.02
Flash: 32 kB (28kB free)
RAM: 1024 Byte
Eeprom: 32 kB
Crypto: Yes (RSA)
Protocol: T0 / T1 / TE
Language: ASM, (C)
Programmable @ 3.57 MHz using Smart Mouse

SmartKey Titanium Features:

General

High-performance, Low-Power Secure AVR RISC Archtiecture
133 powerfull Instructions ( Most executed in a single clock cycle )
Linear adressing of up to 8 M Bytes of and up to 16 M Bytes of Data
Low-Power idle and Power-down modes
ISO 7816-2 compliant
ESD Protection to ~ 6000V
Operating range from 2,7 V to 5,5 V
Compliant with GSM, 3GPP and EMV

Memory

ISO 7816 Controller
Up to 625 kbs at 5 MHz
Compliant with T = 0 and T = 1 Protocols
Two I/O Ports (Configurable to Support Communication Protocols including 2-wire Interfaces)
Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) Controller
Programmable Internal Oscillator (Up to 16 MHz on ROM)
Two 16bit timers
Randum number generator
2-level, 8-vector Interrupt controller
Hardware DES and Triple-DES DPA Resistant
Checksum Accelerator
8-bit GF (2n) Multiplier
Crypto-coprocessor (Pre-programmed Functions for Cryptography and Authentification, including RSA, DSA, Key Generation, ECC) Security


Dedicated Hardware for Protection against SPA/DPA Attacks
Advanced Protection against Physical Attack, Including Active Shield
Environmental Protection Systens
Voltage Monitor
Frequency Monitor
Temperature Monitor
 
Oeps, wel erg dedicated.

't zal me verbazen, als dat in een fun past. ;-)

Bedankt!
 
De bekende DPA aanvalsmethode is bij het gros van de smartcards nog steeds mogelijk.. Hoewel het door deze dedicated hardware protecties word beschermd, is het volgens de echte guru's nog steeds kraakbaar met deze techniek:

(....)In 1995, an attack technique was published that measured minute differences in the time taken to execute chosen instructions, enabling secret binary key values stored in the smartcard to be deduced. In 1996, this class of attack was developed further. Cryptographic researchers in San Francisco discovered two powerful new non-invasive smartcard attacks which they named simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). The SPA attack exploits the fact that the amount of power consumed by a smartcard chip is directly related to the sequence of software instructions it executes. This will reveal cryptographic key values. The attack can be defeated relatively easily by using a combination of software and hardware techniques to create enough random 'noise' to mask the internal instructions being performed(.....)


(....) However, the DPA attack is far more difficult to defeat. DPA relies on collecting a large number of data samples and using statistical techniques to screen out any masking noise. Paul Kocher, the developer of DPA, claims that he has never seen a smartcard that cannot be compromised to some degree using this technique (....)
 



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